Edward Nieznanski developed in 2007 and 2008 two different systems in formal logic which deal with the problem of evil. Particularly, his aim is to refute a version of the logical problem of evil associated with a form of religious determinism. In this paper, we revisit his first system to give a more suitable form to it, reformulating it in first-order modal logic. The new resulting system, called N1, has much of the original basic structure, and many axioms, definitions, and (...) theorems still remain; however, some new results are obtained. If the conclusions attained are correct and true, then N1 solves the problem of evil through the refutation of a version of religious determinism, showing that the attributes of God in Classical Theism, namely, those of omniscience, omnipotence, infallibility, and omnibenevolence, when adequately formalized, are consistent with the existence of evil in the world. We consider that N1 is a good example of how formal systems can be applied in solving interesting philosophical issues, particularly in Philosophy of Religion and Analytic Theology, establishing bridges between such disciplines. (shrink)

Edward Nieznański developed two logical systems to deal with the problem of evil and to refute religious determinism. However, when formalized in first-order modal logic, two axioms of each system contradict one another, revealing that there is an underlying minimal set of axioms enough to settle the questions. In this article, we develop this minimal system, called N3, which is based on Nieznański’s contribution. The purpose of N3 is to solve the logical problem of evil through the defeat of a (...) version of religious determinism. On the one hand, these questions are also addressed by Nieznański’s systems, but, on the other hand, they are obtained in N3 with fewer assumptions. Our approach can be considered a case of logic of religion, that is, of logic applied to religious discourse, as proposed by Józef Maria Bocheński; in this particular case, it is a discourse in theodicy, which is situated in the context of the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga (1993a, 1993b, 2000) argues that de jure objections to theism depend on de facto objections: in order to say that belief in God is not warranted, one should first assume that this belief is false. Assuming Plantinga’s epistemology and his de facto/de jure distinction, In this essay, I argue that to show that belief in miracles is not warranted, one must suppose that belief in miracles is always false. Therefore, a person who holds a skeptical position regarding miracles (...) must choose either to find evidence that all of the supposed miracles are false, or admit that one is assuming an areligious commitment as a starting point. (shrink)

O problema lógico do mal é a alegação de que a existência de Deus e a existência de mal no mundo são logicamente inconsistentes. Neste artigo, descrevemos o sistema N3, baseado em partes na contribuição de Nieznański (2007, 2008), que oferece uma resposta ao problema lógico do mal através da refutação de uma versão do determinismo religioso. Argumentamos especificamente que, dados os resultados de N3, a existência de Deus não é contraditória com a do mal, e portanto, o teísmo clássico (...) não pode ser considerado irracional com base no problema lógico do mal. Nossa abordagem pode ser considerada um caso de lógica da religião, ou seja, de lógica aplicada ao discurso religioso. (shrink)

Edward Nieznański developed two logical systems in order to deal with a version of the problem of evil associated with two formulations of religious determinism. The aim of this research was to revisit these systems, providing them with a more appropriate formalization. The new resulting systems, namely, N1 and N2, were reformulated in first-order modal logic; they retain much of their original basic structures, but some additional results were obtained. Furthermore, our research found that an underlying minimal set of axioms (...) is enough to settle the questions proposed. Thus, we developed a minimal system, called N3, that solves the same issues tackled by N1 and N2, but with less assumptions than these systems. All of the systems developed here are proposed as solutions to the logical problem of evil through the refutation of two versions of religious determinism, showing that the attributes of God in Classical Theism, namely, those of omniscience, omnipotence, infallibility, and omnibenevolence, when formalized, are consistent with the existence of evil, providing one more response to this traditional issue. (shrink)

Neste artigo, discutimos como o dilema entre autoridade científica e crenças religiosas, presente no contexto brasileiro da pandemia por COVID-19, se relaciona com a ideia de que há um conflito entre ciência e religião. A partir das contribuições de Harrison e Barbour, argumentamos que, enquanto o modelo de conflito entre ciência e religião não favorece a aceitação da autoridade da ciência em âmbitos religiosos, o de diálogo pode ajudar na reconstrução da confiança pública na ciência.